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Latent Profile Analysis of Schizotypy
and Paranormal Belief: Associations
with Probabilistic Reasoning
Performance
Andrew Denovan, Neil Dagnall, Kenneth Drinkwater* and Andrew Parker
Department of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, United Kingdom
This study assessed the extent to which within-individual variation in schizotypy
and paranormal belief influenced performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks.
A convenience sample of 725 non-clinical adults completed measures assessing
schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; O-Life brief), belief
in the paranormal (Revised Paranormal Belief Scale; RPBS) and probabilistic reasoning
(perception of randomness, conjunction fallacy, paranormal perception of randomness,
and paranormal conjunction fallacy). Latent profile analysis (LPA) identified four distinct
groups: class 1, low schizotypy and low paranormal belief (43.9% of sample); class
2, moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief (18.2%); class 3, moderate
schizotypy (high cognitive disorganization) and low paranormal belief (29%); and class 4,
moderate schizotypy and high paranormal belief (8.9%). Identification of homogeneous
classes provided a nuanced understanding of the relative contribution of schizotypy
and paranormal belief to differences in probabilistic reasoning performance. Multivariate
analysis of covariance revealed that groups with lower levels of paranormal belief
(classes 1 and 3) performed significantly better on perception of randomness, but not
conjunction problems. Schizotypy had only a negligible effect on performance. Further
analysis indicated that framing perception of randomness and conjunction problems in
a paranormal context facilitated performance for all groups but class 4.
Keywords: framing effects, latent profile analysis, paranormal belief, probabilistic reasoning, schizotypy
INTRODUCTION
Previous research has established that schizotypy and belief in the paranormal predict propensity
to heuristic bias (see Dagnall et al., 2016b). Heuristics are simple shortcuts, or mental rules of
thumb, that guide subjective estimation of event probability in situations of uncertainty (Gigerenzer
and Gaissmaier, 2011). People use heuristics when likelihoods are unknown and/or information is
complex or incomplete (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1993). Such features are often evident in
real-world situations, hence heuristics regularly guide everyday decision-making (Gigerenzer and
Gaissmaier, 2011).
Cognitively, heuristic based decision-making is frugal and expedient. Since heuristics
consider only limited evidence, they reduce cognitive load and facilitate rapid formation of
judgments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). Acknowledging these
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characteristics, the predominant academic view of heuristic
based decision-making is that it typically yields reasonable
outcomes, but can on occasion produce severe and systematic
error (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). Although, theorists
often link heuristics to sub-optimal judgments (deviations
from probability, irrationality, and error-proneness), heuristics
actually frequently produce accurate or adequate judgments
(Costello and Mathison, 2014).
Germane to the current study was the notion that an
association exists between heuristic judgments and illusory
causation, specifically appreciation of chance (randomness).
Illustratively, Dagnall et al. (2016b) found that misperception
of chance (faulty perception of randomness) and conjunction
error (fallacy) were associated with higher levels of schizotypy
and belief in the paranormal. These biases explicitly index
insensitivity to probability (Arnott, 1998, 2006).
Misperception of randomness denotes the tendency to
perceive patterns and relationships within unconnected
data/stimuli (Dagnall et al., 2007). This may manifest as the
inability to judge accurately the likelihood of strings and
sequences (Blackmore and Tros´cianko, 1985). With reference
to belief in the paranormal, misrepresentation of randomness
often expresses as illusory causation (magical ideation) (Dagnall
et al., 2016b). Magical ideation is the propensity to infer causal
relationships between unrelated events (Eckblad and Chapman,
1983). Preceding studies indicate that magical ideation is
associated with higher levels of both schizotypy (Eckblad and
Chapman, 1983) and paranormal belief (Williams and Irwin,
1991; Thalbourne and French, 1995).
Acknowledging this, Dagnall et al. (2016b) proposed that
believers in the paranormal attribute/ascribe unwarranted
connections to non-related stimuli in a belief consistent manner.
For example, if whilst thinking about someone who has not been
in contact for some time that person suddenly telephone calls
or emails (coincidence), a believer in extrasensory perception
(ESP) might view this occurrence as evidence for the existence
of psi phenomena (such as psychic communication/telepathy or
premonition/precognition) (Irwin et al., 2013).
Conjunction error occurs when expectation of conjoint
conditions (event intersection) exceeds that of individual
constituent parts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). This is a logical
impossibility. The likelihood of event concurrence (A and B) can
never exceed that of component parts (A or B alone) because
the possibility set of the conjunction comprises the extension
of its constituents (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). Information
representativeness (event typicality) and availability (ease of
retrieval) often make conjunctions inappropriately appear more
probable than individual elements (Tversky and Kahneman,
1982).
To summarize, heuristic-based decision-making generally
generates good/reasonable, adaptive outcomes with minimal
cognitive effort. However, in certain situations heuristics can
result in bias (i.e., partial, inadequate or preferential appreciation
of evidence), which produce sub-optimal judgments. In this
context, higher levels of paranormal belief are associated with
proneness to statistical bias, specifically misperception of chance.
Schizotypy and Anomalous Belief
Schizotypy is a complex, multidimensional psychopathological
construct (Lenzenweger, 2015). Conceptually, schizotypy
facilitates examination of the schizophrenia-spectrum within
the general population. The applicability of schizotypy to non-
clinical samples moderates confounds associated with clinical
patients (i.e., symptom severity and general decline in cognitive
performance) (Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015; Lenzenweger, 2015).
Correspondingly, schizotypy possesses positive, negative and
disorganized dimensions and resembles factorial models of
schizophrenia (Bentall et al., 1989; Cicero and Kerns, 2010;
Dembinska-Krajewska and Rybakowski, 2014).
The positive (psychotic-like) factor encompasses perceptual
oddities (i.e., illusions to hallucinations), disruptions in the
content of thought (odd beliefs and magical ideation through
to delusions), and suspiciousness and paranoia. The negative
(deficit) factor references decreased emotional affect (e.g.,
anhedonia, flattened affect, and disinterest in others and the
world). Finally, disorganization includes disruption to thought
(organization and expression) and behavior, ranging from mild
disturbances to formal thought disorder and grossly disorganized
actions. Whilst, there is debate about the appropriateness of
this widely published three-factor model, positive and negative
schizotypy represent the most robust, consistently replicated
dimensions (Kwapil et al., 2012).
Regarding the factorial structure of schizotypy, several
theorists propose alternative models. For example, four-factor
models comprising cognitive-perceptual, paranoid, negative, and
disorganized (Compton et al., 2009) and unusual experiences,
cognitive disorganization, introvertive anhedonia and impulsive
non-conformity (Mason et al., 2005). The present paper, by virtue
of themeasure of schizotypy employed (O-Life brief) adopted the
model outlined by Mason et al. (2005).
At a theoretical level, conceptualization of schizotypy varies
as a function of a researcher’s theoretical position on the
mental health-mental illness continuum (i.e., quasi-dimensional,
dimensional and fully dimensional). The current study assumed
the individual differences approach (Claridge and Beech, 1995),
which views schizotypy as a personality dimension. This
perspective locates respondents on a continuum between relative
psychological health and schizophrenia (psychosis) (Barrantes-
Vidal et al., 2015). Explicitly, the model delineates schizotypy
as a “tendency for characteristics of the psychotic states to
be found, in mild degree, among healthy people” (Claridge,
1997, p. 31). This delimitation acknowledges that high levels of
schizotypy may exist within non-clinical populations, without
developing into spectrum symptoms (Dembinska-Krajewska and
Rybakowski, 2014). Furthermore, this paper extended the work
of Dagnall et al. (2016b), who also employed the personality
perspective.
Specifically, Dagnall et al. (2016b) examined relationships
between schizotypy, belief in the paranormal and proneness
to heuristic bias. They found that the Unusual Experience
(UE) subscale of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings
and Experience (O-LIFE scale brief) predicted propensity
to both perception of randomness and conjunction fallacy.
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In comparison, belief in the paranormal was more strongly
associated with perception of randomness. Overall, there was
a stronger relationship between belief in the paranormal (vs.
UE) and statistical bias; level of paranormal belief mediated
the strength of association between UE and perception of
randomness, but not between UE and conjunction fallacy.
Problem type (standard vs. paranormal context) influenced
the relationship between UE and statistical bias. Framing
strengthened the association between UE and conjunction
fallacy.
These results supported Williams and Irwin’s (1991)
supposition that belief in the paranormal provides a framework
for structuring cognitive-perceptual factors associated with
positive schizotypy. Findings concurred also with the observation
that higher levels of schizotypy and belief in the paranormal
were associated with the tendency to perceive unrelated events as
connected (causally related) (Dagnall et al., 2016b). Furthermore,
Williams and Irwin (1991) reported that schizotypes differed
from believers in the paranormal and resembled schizophrenics
in terms of cognitive style. Believers conveyed a cognitive style
reliant on notions of personal responsibility, while schizotypes
emphasized the role of randomness.
Research on schizotypy provides a framework for theorizing
about individual differences in cognitive-perceptual style. This
extends to anomalous beliefs and the deployment of heuristics
strategies. Explicitly, the notion that schizotypal characteristics
relate directly to anomalous beliefs and, via the anomalous
beliefs-heuristic bias relationship, have an indirect effect on
proneness to heuristic bias.
Belief in the Paranormal
Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between
propensity to probabilistic reasoning bias and belief in
the paranormal. In a widely cited paper, Dagnall et al.
(2007) examined whether belief in the paranormal linked
to a general weakness in probabilistic reasoning, or was
explainable via specific biases. They achieved this by asking
participants to complete the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(RPBS) (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983) alongside probabilistic
problems indexing perception of randomness, appreciation
of base rate information, susceptibility to conjunction
fallacy and derivation of expected value. Analysis revealed
that perception of randomness predicted paranormal
belief. Median split comparisons supported this finding;
participants high (vs. low) in paranormal belief performed less
well.
The findings stimulated debate and additional work.
Particularly, Rogers et al. (2009, 2011) contended that
methodological issues within the Dagnall et al. (2007)
study undermined the importance of conjunction error.
Using the Scenario Judgments Questionnaire, a newly
developed measure, Rogers et al. (2009) observed that
believers (vs. non-believers) made more conjunction errors.
Additionally, they reported a context effect, whereby standard
(vs. paranormal) problems produced more errors. In a follow-
up study, Rogers et al. (2011) replicated the finding that
believers (vs. non-believers) produced more conjunction
errors, but failed to reproduce the previously observed context
effect.
Noting the weak, inconsistent nature of conjunction effects
and addressing the methodological concerns raised by Rogers
et al. (2009, 2011), Dagnall et al. (2014) performed a re-evaluation
of the Dagnall et al. (2007) study. Findings supported the
original study, perception of randomness best predicted level of
paranormal belief. Additionally, conjunction error was weakly
associated with only traditional paranormal belief (TPB). TPB
is a RPBS dimension related to individual control of social and
cultural factors (Goode, 2000). Dagnall et al. (2014) also observed
a context effect. Paranormal framed problems proved easier to
solve (vs. standard problems), however, this advantage declined
within believers.
Dagnall et al. (2016a) extended this paradigm via the
addition of paranormal framed perception of randomness
problems. Outcomes reinforced those of Dagnall et al. (2014).
Explicitly, perception of randomness (vs. susceptibility to
conjunction fallacy) was more strongly associated with belief
in the paranormal. Conjunction error correlated only with
TPB. Further analysis revealed that shared variance with
perception of randomness tasks explained the relationship
between conjunction and belief in the paranormal. In the context
of paranormal belief, proneness to conjunction represented
a specific instance of misperception of randomness (Rogers,
2014; Dagnall et al., 2016a). Concerning context effects, results
mirrored the previous findings by Dagnall et al. (2014);
paranormal framed problems were easier to solve, and this
advantage declined as a function of belief in the paranormal.
The observation that believers in the paranormal demonstrate
poorer appreciation of randomness was consistent with
several previous studies. Notably, Bressan (2002) reported that
unusual coincidences (co-occurring random events) were often
considered paranormal (causally related) because of the failure to
appreciate the probability of chance occurrence. Brugger (1997)
explained this in terms of a lower threshold of causal attribution,
believers (vs. disbelievers) require less objective evidence in order
to establish cause and effect relationships between proximal or
attendant events. Indeed, believers are prone to detecting
meaning within visual noise patterns (Blackmore and Moore,
1994).
Recent work has qualified the conditions under which
conjunction error best relates to belief in the paranormal.
Explicitly, believers in the paranormal are prone to endorsing
conjunctions when preceding information inductively confirms
the constituent (Rogers et al., 2016). Additionally, Prike et al.
(2017) found that the relationship between anomalistic belief
and conjunction error occurred only for beliefs about having
experienced anomalistic phenomena (vs. theoretical anomalistic
beliefs).
To the extent that belief in the paranormal is relatively
stable, the tendency to endorse such beliefs represents
an individual difference. This expresses as variances on
cognitive-perceptual factors. Particularly, belief in the
paranormal is concomitant with both higher levels of
schizotypy and the sub-optimal use of cognitive shortcuts
(heuristics).
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The Present Study
Schizotypy and belief in the paranormal are associated with
susceptibility to heuristic bias. This relationship appears to
arise from the tendency to connect unrelated events causally
(presumably via cognitive-perceptual factors related to odd
beliefs and magical thinking) and is linked with specific
decrements linked to appreciation of statistical bias (i.e.,
perception of randomness and conjunction). However, construct
overlap between schizotypy and belief in the paranormal make
it difficult to determine the relative degree to which each factor
contributes to this deficit.
Explicitly, the Schizotypal Personality Disorder diagnostic
criteria indexes odd beliefs or magical thinking and unusual
perceptual experiences (Hergovich et al., 2008). Odd beliefs or
magical thinking are directly relevant to belief in the paranormal
as evidenced by specific reference to superstitiousness, belief in
clairvoyance, telepathy, or “sixth sense.” The association with
unusual experiences, however, is less direct because unusual
cognitions and perceptions are not necessary precursors of
belief in the paranormal. This link requires an additional
attributional phase, which ascribes paranormal causation to
unusual experiences (Irwin et al., 2013).
Recognizing this two-tier process, whereby perception of a
paranormal experience derives from both detection and labeling
of potential anomalies, Irwin et al. (2013) developed the Survey
of Anomalous Experiences. This yields two scores, an index of
proneness to anomalous experiences (PAE) and a measure of
proneness to paranormal attributions (PPA). Irwin et al. (2013)
found that the correlation between the unusual experiences
(UE) subscale of the O-LIFE and PPA was in the weak to
moderate range; adjusting the UE to control for potentially,
confounding transpersonal experiences had little effect on this
relationship. This finding was consistent with previous studies
reporting amoderate positive correlation between schizotypy and
belief in the paranormal (Hergovich et al., 2008; Dagnall et al.,
2010; Darwin et al., 2011). Furthermore, Hergovich et al. (2008)
reported that schizotypy predicted core aspects of belief in the
paranormal (i.e., psi, precognition, spiritualism and witchcraft).
Whilst numerous studies document the correlation between
schizotypy and belief in the paranormal, the relationship is
only moderate. Consequently, associations with related beliefs
vary across belief types. For instance, Hergovich et al. (2008)
found that schizotypy was a predictor of core components of
paranormal belief (i.e., belief in precognition, psi, witchcraft,
and spiritualism), whereas belief in traditional religious contents,
superstitious thoughts and belief in the existence of extraordinary
life forms were better predicted by belief in the paranormal.
Although previous research has consistently established a link
between schizotypy and paranormal belief, studies examining
this relationship have typically conceptualized these as separate
yet related dimensions. For instance, analysis uses correlations,
regressions, or path models to examine how the factors
relate to probabilistic reasoning performance (e.g., Dagnall
et al., 2016b). This reflects a variable-centered approach, which
fails to account for the way these dimensions relate within
individuals. Some research has carried out cluster analysis to
measure within-participant variation in schizotypy, revealing
four subtypes (“low schizotypes,” “high schizotypes,” “negative
schizotypes,” and “positive/happy schizotypes”) (Loughland and
Williams, 1997). In addition, Hori et al. (2014) used latent
profile analysis (LPA) to assess homogeneous groups based
on schizotypy, temperament and character, also revealing a
“positive/adaptive” group, a “negative/maladaptive” group, and
a “low schizotypy/adaptive” group. However, research has
not examined whether combined profiles of schizotypy and
paranormal belief exist. This is surprising given the evidence
supporting conceptual overlap and the observation of shared
characteristics (odd beliefs and unusual perceptual experiences)
(Hergovich et al., 2008).
Using a variable-centered approach assumes that the results
from any analysis is an estimate of the relationships among
the distinct variables averaged across the whole population,
also expected to be homogeneous (Orri et al., 2017). For
example, a variable-centered analysis could reveal that levels of
paranormal beliefs are high and levels of schizotypy are low
in a given sample. Contrastingly, a person-centered approach
in this same scenario could identify two qualitatively distinct
groups of individuals: one where people possess high paranormal
belief and low schizotypy, and another where people possess
high paranormal belief and high schizotypy. Person-centered
approaches assume populations are heterogeneous, and in
relation to paranormal belief and schizotypy could reveal a series
of subgroups (i.e., latent profiles) not identified by variable-
centered approaches.
Previous research on heuristic bias has examined relationships
with schizotypy and paranormal belief independently.
Recognizing the potential limitations of this traditional
individual differences approach, the present paper adopted a
person or case centered perspective. This, via LPA, assessed
the conjoint contribution of schizotypy and paranormal
belief to statistical bias. Explicitly, LPA identified naturally
occurring classes (case profiles) that shared similar cognitive-
perceptual characteristics. Accordingly, class membership
provided a method for assessing whether the interaction between
paranormal belief and schizotypy influenced performance
on probabilistic reasoning tasks. From a variable-centered
approach, this was not possible. A further advantage of
LPA (a specific instance of a finite mixture model) was
that subgroups were determined via rigorous empirical
tests.
To our knowledge, no study has previously examined
latent profiles related to schizotypy and paranormal belief.
The advantage of this approach was that it facilitated
examination of the degree to which presence and absence
of schizotypy and belief in the paranormal influenced
probabilistic reasoning performance. Since this was a novel
approach, the researchers did not specify the number of
latent profiles in advance. Based on existing evidence, the
researchers anticipated that probabilistic reasoning task
completion would be lower as a function of higher levels of
schizotypy and belief in the paranormal (e.g., Dagnall et al.,
2017).
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A convenience sample of 725 participants (194 men, 27%; 531
women, 73%) took part in this study. They were recruited
via emails to university staff/students and local stakeholders
(business, leisure and vocational). The sample mean age was
25.50 (SD = 9.40) with a range of 18–64 years (male age, M =
27.55, SD = 10.30, range of 18–41 years; female age, M = 24.75,
SD = 8.94, range of 18–64 years). Within the sample, 530
(73%) were university students studying at a large post-92 UK
university (former polytechnic awarded university status through
the Further and Higher Education Act 1992); 195 (27%) were
non-students. Participants had to be at least 18 years of age to take
part. Prior to participation, a question asked whether participants
had previously studied or taken part in studies investigating
heuristic bias. If participants endorsed the question, participation
discontinued.
Measures
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and
Experiences (O-LIFE)
The O-LIFE brief (Mason et al., 2005) is an abbreviated
form of the original 104-item O-LIFE measure (Mason
et al., 1995). The shortened scale comprises 43 items. These
represent four dimensions: Unusual Experiences (UE) (12
items), Cognitive Disorganization (CD) (11 items), Introvertive
Anhedonia (IA) (10 items) and Impulsive Non-conformity
(IN) (10 items). The UE sub-scale taps positive schizotypy
(perceptual aberrations, magical thinking and hallucinations).
The CD sub-scale measures thought disorder and other
disorganized aspects of psychosis, specifically social anxiety, poor
attention/concentration and decision-making. The IA sub-scale
indexes negative schizotypy (schizoid temperament), particularly
avoidance of intimacy and lack of enjoyment from social
and physical sources of pleasure. The IN sub-scale measures
lack of self-control (i.e., impulsive, anti-social, and eccentric
forms of behavior). Collectively, the O-LIFE brief assesses
schizotypal personality traits in non-clinical individuals. The O-
LIFE possesses sound psychometric qualities, specifically high
internal consistency (Mason et al., 1995) and good test–retest
reliability (Burch et al., 1998). Since development, studies across
psychology related-disciplines have used the O-Life (Mason and
Claridge, 2006).
In this study, the internal consistency of the O-Life brief total
scale, assessed via Cronbach’s alpha (α), was very good (α= 0.87).
Internal consistency was also good for UE (α = 0.76) and CD (α
= 0.81). Alpha reliability for IA (α = 0.65) and IN (α = 0.63),
however, suggested only moderate strength of association among
items. Values across dimensions were consistent with those
reported by Mason et al. (2005). Concerning Cronbach’s alpha,
when the degree of measurement error in psychological/social
science is considered, 0.6 is an acceptable level (Nunnally, 1978).
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS)
The RPBS (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983) assesses belief in the
paranormal and is the most widely used self-report measure
of its type (Goulding and Parker, 2001). The scale contains
26-items, which index seven belief dimensions: spiritualism,
witchcraft, precognition, superstition, psi, traditional religious
beliefs and extraordinary life forms. Items appear as statements
(e.g., “black magic really exists”) and respondents rate each
item on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Whilst, sub-scale dimensionality
remains contested, the RPBS overall demonstrates satisfactory
reliability (Cardeña et al., 2015). Acknowledging these issues,
Lange et al. (2000) conducted a purification of the RPBS
using Rasch scaling and top-down purification. From this
process, two psychometrically superior factors emerged, New
Age Philosophy (NAP) (11-items evaluating belief in psi and
survival of bodily death) and Traditional Paranormal Belief
(TPB) (5-items assessing belief in concepts, such as the devil,
witchcraft, heaven and hell) (Cardeña et al., 2015). These factors
corrected for differential item functioning and accordingly were
free from age or gender bias. These dimensions reflect the
functions of beliefs. NAP provides control over external events,
whereas TPB regulates social/cultural factors (Goode, 2000). The
Rasch scaling procedure requires that participant responses are
recoded (0–6) (Lange et al., 2000), hence adjusted overall scores
range from 0 to 156, with higher scores representing belief in the
paranormal. Scores on TPB range from 11.16 to 43.24, and for
NAP range from 6.85 to 47.72 (Andrich, 1988). Previous research
established that the RPBS possesses adequate validity (Tobacyk,
2004). In this study, internal consistency was very good for the
total RPBS scale (α = 0.88) and NAP (α = 0.82), and was good
for TPB (α= 0.73).
Probabilistic Reasoning Tasks
Four problem types obtained from Dagnall et al. (2007,
2014) assessed probabilistic reasoning ability (perception of
randomness, conjunction fallacy, paranormal perception of
randomness and paranormal conjunction fallacy). Arnott’s
taxonomy of decision biases (1998, 2006) locates judgments of
likelihood (perception of randomness and conjunction) within a
common statistical bias category.
There were five instances of each problem type, which were
organized into four counter-balanced sections. Thus, scores for
each problem type ranged from between 0 and 5. Participants
responded to each item by indicating which outcome they
believed was most probable from the presented range of options.
To assist comparisons, raw scores appear alongside proportions;
these represent the number of correct responses calculated as a
percentage-hit rate. These problems have featured within several
previously published studies (Dagnall et al., 2007, 2014, 2016a).
Perception of randomness
Problems assessed participants’ ability to assess the likelihood
of strings/sequences (e.g., “imagine a coin was tossed six times.
Which pattern of results do you think is most likely?: (a)
HHHHHH, (b) HHHTTT, (c) HTHHTT, (d) all equally likely”).
Conjunction fallacy
Conjunction tasks evaluated the ability to recognize that the
likelihood of event intersection probability could not exceed that
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of single (constituent) events (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1982,
1983) (e.g., “two football teams (TeamA and Team B) are playing
in a local derby. What is the most likely outcome of the game?:
(a) Team A scores first, (b) Team A scores first and win, (c) Team
A scores first and loses, (d) Team A scores first and the game is
drawn”).
Paranormal perception of randomness
Paranormal perception of randomness items presented
judgments about the likelihood of strings/sequences occurrence
within a paranormal context. For example, “A famous psychic,
with renowned paranormal abilities, has successfully predicted
the outcome of the last 6 annually held boat races between two
famous English Universities [University A and University B].
This year the psychic predicts University B will win. Which of the
following is most likely?: (a) University A will win the event, (b)
University B will win the event, (c) University A and University
B are both equally as likely to win the event.” These items had the
same underlying structure as standard perception of randomness
problems.
Paranormal conjunction fallacy
Paranormal conjunctions presented each conjunction within a
paranormal context. For instance, “Andrew often sits by the
telephone at work. Just as he is thinking about his friend,
she rings: (a) Elaine rang because Andrew was thinking about
her [event intersection], (b) Andrew was thinking about Elaine
because she was about to ring [event intersection], (c) Elaine
rang [single event]).” Paranormal conjunction fallacy problems
possessed the same structure as standard conjunctions (the
probability of event intersection could not exceed the likelihood
of single (constituent) events.
Procedure
Prospective participants read the study brief prior to deciding
whether to take part in the study. Participants indicated informed
consent by ticking a box prior to participation. This protocol
ensured that respondents understood the instructions. No
personal information was collected other than age, occupational
status, preferred gender and general location. Consenting
participants received the materials booklet. Study instructions
requested that participants answer questions honestly and work
through items systematically in their own time. Study booklets
comprised three sections: demographic information (completed
first), problem tasks, schizotypy and paranormal belief measures.
The presentation of schizotypy and paranormal belief measures
rotated across participants. Following completion of the
materials booklet participants were debriefed.
Ethics
The researchers obtained ethical approval for the study as part
of an unsuccessful research bid. Specifically, the Director of
the Research Institute for Health and Social Change (Faculty
of Health, Psychology and Social Care) within Manchester
Metropolitan University ratified the project (this includes ethical
scrutiny and gaining clearance in principal); 01/08/2016. It is
also a university condition that the relevant Departmental Head
authorizes the project. This is the necessary level of ethical
clearance for projects rated as “routine.” Furthermore, members
of the Professoriate (or equivalent) peer-review proposals prior
to submission. Formal submission to a university ethics panel
beyond this process is not an institutional requirement for
routine studies.
Analysis
Analyses used SPSS 23, apart from LPA, which required Mplus
version 7 (Muthén and Muthén, 2012). Following initial data
screening preliminary analysis computed descriptive statistics.
Next, based on O-Life and RPBS scores exploratory LPA
determined latent group membership. The first stage in model fit
involved evaluating a 1-class model. The number of latent classes
in subsequent models increased until the addition of further
classes was not justified.
The optimal number of latent classes was determined by
considering a range of indices; the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC; Akaike, 1987), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC;
Schwarz, 1978), the sample-size adjusted BIC (ssaBIC; Sclove,
1987), the Lo-Mendell-Rubin-adjusted likelihood ratio test
(LMR-A-LRT; Lo et al., 2001), and a standardized measure
of entropy (Ramaswamy et al., 1993). For AIC, BIC, and
ssaBIC smaller values indicate better fit. The LMR-A-LRT
does not rely on chi-square distribution for the difference in
model likelihood values. LMR-A-LRT values normally occur
alongside associated p-values. Progressive class solutions are
computed until a non-significant LMR-A-LRT p-value occurs,
which indicates a non-significant improvement in fit. Lastly,
entropy ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values suggesting a better
classification of participants. An entropy value above 0.8 reflects
a sound separation of identified classes in relation to the data
(Ramaswamy et al., 1993).
Latent class membership acted as a group variable
(independent variable) for assessing whether differences
existed on probabilistic reasoning task performance (dependent
variable). Multivariate analysis of covariance, with possible
confounders (defined below) as covariates, then allowed
comparison of group performance on probabilistic reasoning
tasks. Lastly, t-tests examined framing effects (i.e., whether
framing probabilistic reasoning tasks in a paranormal context
influenced performance).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Prior to analysis, data screening removed outliers. Three z-scores
were marginally greater than 3.25, these were transformed to the
next highest score (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). As can be seen
from Table 1, all schizotypy-total and sub-factor scores, apart
from Introverted Anhedonia (IA), correlated positively with
paranormal belief-total and sub-factors (New Age Philosophy,
NAP, and Traditional Paranormal Belief, TPB). In addition,
probabilistic reasoning performance correlated negatively with
schizotypy and paranormal belief scores. The exception to
this trend was IA, which did not significantly correlate with
perception of randomness (PR) or conjunction fallacy (CF).
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among all study variables.
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. O-Life-Total 15.00 7.69 0.79** 0.85** 0.58** 0.78** 0.23** 0.24** 0.23** −0.15** −0.11* −0.25** −0.16**
2. UE 3.71 2.70 0.52** 0.27** 0.54** 0.32** 0.32** 0.34** −0.16** −0.13* −0.33** −0.17**
3. CD 5.40 3.16 0.33** 0.58** 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** −0.09* −0.09* −0.15** −0.06
4. IA 2.33 2.04 0.28** −0.01 0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.03 −0.14** −0.11*
5. IN 3.56 2.16 0.17** 0.19** 0.18** −0.13** −0.07* −0.15** −0.16**
6. RPBS-Total 64.93 31.36 0.88** 0.82** −0.24** −0.14** −0.45** −0.37**
7. NAP 17.82 13.24 0.75** −0.20** −0.11* −0.45** −0.41**
8. TPB 9.28 7.45 −0.31** −0.16** −0.42** −0.35**
9. PR 3.76 1.06 0.19** 0.23** 0.38**
10. CF 1.91 1.29 0.26** 0.13**
11. PCF 4.29 1.09 0.52**
12. PPR 4.43 1.13
O-Life-Total, Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Personal Experiences-Total; UE, Unusual Experiences; CD, Cognitive Disorganization; IA, Introverted Anhedonia; IN, Impulsive Non-conformity;
RPBS-Total, Revised Paranormal Belief Scale-Total; NAP, New Age Philosophy; TPB, Traditional Paranormal Beliefs; PR, Perception of Randomness; CF, Conjunction Fallacy; PCF,
Paranormal Conjunction Fallacy; PPR, Paranormal Perception of Randomness. *Indicates p < 0.05; **Indicates p < 0.001.
Previous research reports gender differences in paranormal
belief (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983; Irwin, 1993; Dag, 1999).
Consideration of gender revealed significant differences
in relation to Paranormal Conjunction Fallacy (PCF), IA,
Paranormal Belief-Total (RPBS), NAP, and TPB (see Table 2).
Men scored higher on solving PR, CF, and PCF probabilistic
reasoning tasks and possessed greater IA levels. Women
reported significantly greater levels of paranormal belief.
Due to these differences, subsequent analyses (LPA and
multivariate analysis of covariance) included gender as a
covariate.
Latent Profile Analysis
LPA used schizotypy and paranormal belief sub-factor scores,
gender was included as a covariate. For the purposes of LPA,
RPBS scores were converted. Explicitly, ratings of 0–3 were
coded as “0” (indicating uncertainty or disagreement) and
ratings of 4–6 were coded as “1” (agreement). This method
of recoding for LPA is consistent with previous research using
Likert scales (e.g., see Deleuze et al., 2015; Hussain et al.,
2015).
An initial comparison of 1-class and 2-class models was
undertaken. AIC, BIC and ssaBIC indices suggested superior fit
of the 2-class model, and the LMR-A-LRT for the 2-class model
indicated significant improvement over the 1-class model (see
Table 3). A comparison of 2-class and 3-class solutions revealed
that the 3-class solution was superior, due to lower AIC, BIC,
ssaBIC statistics, higher entropy (0.86 vs. 0.82), and a significant
LMR-A-LRT p-value. Next, a 4-class solution designated superior
fit in comparison with a 3-class solution, evident from lower
AIC, BIC, ssaBIC statistics, higher entropy (0.87 vs. 0.86), and
a significant LMR-A-LRT p-value. A five-class model indicated
a non-significant improvement over the 4-class solution; hence,
there was no further consideration of solutions.
The 4-class solution represented the best fitting model. In
this model (see Figure 1), 43.9% (n = 316) of the sample were
TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations and t-test outcomes for all study variables
by gender.
Gender
Men Women Independent t-test
Variable Mean SD Mean SD t(df = 723) Sig.
PR 3.90 1.04 3.71 1.06 2.09 0.037
CF 2.11 1.59 1.84 1.16 2.12 0.035
PPR 4.52 1.07 4.40 1.15 1.31 0.189
PCF 4.52 0.85 4.21 1.16 3.42 <0.001**
O-Life-Total 15.65 8.64 14.76 7.31 1.38 0.166
UE 3.93 2.72 3.63 2.70 1.33 0.184
CD 5.05 3.25 5.52 3.12 −1.77 0.077
IA 2.84 2.43 2.15 1.88 4.04 <0.001**
IN 3.82 2.34 3.45 2.09 2.04 0.041
RPBS-Total 54.07 26.40 68.90 32.10 −6.30 <0.001**
NAP 13.13 10.93 19.53 13.60 −6.50 <0.001**
TPB 6.79 6.31 10.18 7.63 −6.02 <0.001**
**Indicates p < 0.004 (Bonferroni adjustment).
classified into class 1, and scored low on both schizotypy and
paranormal belief. Class 2 represented 18.2% (n = 120), and
evidenced intermediate scores on schizotypy and paranormal
belief. Class 3 comprised 29% (n = 221), demonstrating
low scores on paranormal belief and intermediate scores on
schizotypy apart from Cognitive Disorganization (CD) which
reflected a high score. Finally, 8.9% (n = 68) comprised class
4, and evidenced intermediate schizotypy scores and high scores
on paranormal belief, particularly NAP. Based on these profiles,
class 1 represented a “low schizotypy and low paranormal belief”
group, class 2 a “moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal
belief” group, class 3 a “moderate schizotypy (high CD) and low
paranormal belief” group, and class 4 a “moderate schizotypy and
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high paranormal belief” group. Average latent class probabilities
for most likely latent class membership were 0.95 for class 1, 0.84
for class 2, 0.94 for class 3, and 0.93 for class 4, indicating good
overall discrimination.
Association of Latent Profiles with
Probabilistic Reasoning Task Performance
To examine group performance on probabilistic reasoning
tasks, multivariate analysis of covariance with gender as a
covariate was undertaken (see Table 4). Analysis revealed a
significant main effect of group, Pillai’s trace = 0.31, F(12, 2,157)
= 20.37, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.102 (medium effect size). The
analysis also reported significant effects of group in relation to
each probabilistic reasoning task (perception of randomness,
conjunction fallacy, paranormal conjunction fallacy, paranormal
perception of randomness). Gender had a non-significant effect
on probabilistic reasoning performance, Pillai’s trace = 0.02,
F(4, 717) = 2.37, p= 0.051.
TABLE 3 | Fit of competing latent profile models.
Model AIC BIC ssaBIC LMR-A LMR-A
p-value
Entropy
1-class 20,317.18 20,381.39 20,336.93
2-class 19,548.70 19,649.59 19,579.74 769.86 <0.001 0.82
3-class 19,053.84 19,191.42 19,096.16 501.34 <0.001 0.86
4-class 18,833.46 19,007.73 18,887.07 231.97 0.005 0.87
5-class 18,705.28 18,916.24 18,770.18 141.49 0.200 0.87
AIC, Akaike Information Criterion; BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion; ssaBIC, sample-
size adjusted BIC; LMR-A, Lo-Mendell-Rubin-adjusted likelihood ratio test.
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
(Table 4) revealed that the “low schizotypy and low paranormal
belief” group (M = 3.96, SD = 0.96) performed significantly
better on PR tasks than the “moderate schizotypy and moderate
paranormal belief” group (M = 3.45, SD = 1.07) and the
“moderate schizotypy and high paranormal belief” group (M
= 3.22, SD = 1.47). The “moderate schizotypy (high CD) and
low paranormal belief” group (M = 3.83, SD = 0.97) were
significantly better at solving PR problems than the “moderate
schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief” group (M = 3.45,
SD = 1.07) and the “moderate schizotypy and high paranormal
belief” group (M = 3.22, SD = 1.47). Interestingly, there existed
nomeaningful differences in performance on CF tasks among the
distinct latent profiles.
The “low schizotypy and low paranormal belief” group (M
= 4.73, SD = 0.56) were the most adept at solving PCF
problems, followed by the “moderate schizotypy (high CD) and
low paranormal belief” group (M = 4.37, SD = 0.91), and the
“moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief” group
(M = 3.80, SD = 1.38). The “moderate schizotypy and high
paranormal belief” group (M = 2.90, SD = 1.46) performed the
worst at solving PCF problems.
Similarly, the “low schizotypy and low paranormal belief”
group (M = 4.73, SD = 0.81) were the most proficient at solving
PPR problems, followed by the “moderate schizotypy (high CD)
and low paranormal belief” group (M= 4.62, SD= 0.78), and the
“moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief” group
(M = 4.07, SD = 1.38). The “moderate schizotypy and high
paranormal belief” group (M = 3.12, SD = 1.70) performed the
worst at solving PPR problems.
To examine framing effects, a series of t-tests were conducted
post-hoc (with a Bonferroni adjusted alpha of 0.006) comparing
PR and CF task performance with PPR and PCF task
FIGURE 1 | Pattern of mean scores on the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-Life) and the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) as a
function of latent class. PB, Paranormal Belief; UETotal, Unusual Experiences-Total; CDTotal, Cognitive Disorganization-Total; IATotal, Introverted Anhedonia-Total;
INTotal, Impulsive Non-conformity-Total; NAPTotal, New Age Philosophy-Total; TPBTotal, Traditional Paranormal Belief-Total.
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performance for each latent profile (see Table 5). A framing
effect was present for the “low schizotypy and low paranormal
belief” group, evident by the significantly greater scores in
task performance for PPR vs. PR and PCF vs. CF. Similarly,
for the “moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief”
group, PPR performance was significantly greater than PR
performance, and PCF performance was significantly greater
than CF performance. For the “moderate schizotypy (high
CD) and low paranormal belief” group, participants recorded
greater performance on PPR vs. PR tasks and on PCF vs. CF
tasks. A framing effect was not apparent for the “moderate
schizotypy and high paranormal belief” group in relation to
perception of randomness, but seemed to occur for conjunction
problems.
TABLE 4 | The effects of group (latent profile) on probabilistic reasoning task performance.
Dependent Variable
PR CF PPR PCF
ANCOVA MANCOVA
Fdf (Sig.; η2) Fdf (Sig.; η2) Fdf (Sig.; η2) Fdf (Sig.; η2) Pillai’s trace Fdf (Sig.) η2
Variable
Group 12.793,720
(<0.001;
0.051)
2.893,720
(0.035; 0.012)
79.043,720
(<0.001; 0.248)
53.013,720
(<0.001; 0.181)
0.31 20.3712, 2157
(< 0.001)
0.102
Covariate
Gender 1.361,720
(0.243; 0.002)
5.161,720
(0.023; 0.007)
3.101,720
(0.079; 0.004)
0.181,720
(0.665; 0.000)
0.02 2.384, 717
(0.051)
0.013
Pairwise Comparisons (Mean Differences) between Classes
Class contrast Mean diff.
(Sig.)
Mean diff.
(Sig.)
Mean diff.
(Sig.)
Mean diff.
(Sig.)
Class 1 vs. Class 2 0.49 (<0.001) 0.23 (0.635) 0.91 (<0.001) 0.67 (<0.001)
Class 1 vs. Class 3 0.13 (0.812) 0.27 (0.106) 0.37 (<0.001) 0.11 (1.0)
Class 1 vs. Class 4 0.72 (<0.001) 0.38 (0.176) 1.82 (<0.001) 1.62 (<0.001)
Class 2 vs. Class 3 −0.36 (0.017) 0.04 (1.0) −0.54 (<0.001) −0.56 (<0.001)
Class 2 vs. Class 4 0.23 (0.885) 0.15 (1.0) 0.90 (<0.001) 0.95 (<0.001)
Class 3 vs. Class 4 0.59 (<0.001) 0.11 (1.0) 1.44 (<0.001) 1.51 (<0.001)
PR, Perception of randomness; CF, Conjunction Fallacy; PPR, Paranormal Perception of Randomness; PCF, Paranormal Conjunction Fallacy; Class 1, Low schizotypy and low paranormal
belief (n = 316); Class 2, Moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief (n = 120); Class 3, Moderate schizotypy, high CD and low paranormal belief (n = 221); and Class 4,
Moderate schizotypy and high paranormal belief (n = 68).
TABLE 5 | Probabilistic reasoning performance as a function of class membership.
Probabilistic reasoning type Comparisons
Perception of
randomness
(PR)
Paranormal
perception of
randomness
(PPR)
Conjunction
fallacy (CF)
Paranormal
conjunction
fallacy (PCF)
PR vs. PPR CF vs. PCF
Class membership M SD Prop.
correct
(%)
M SD Prop.
correct
(%)
M SD Prop.
correct
(%)
M SD Prop.
correct
(%)
t (df) Sig. t (df) Sig.
Class 1 3.96 0.96 79 4.73 0.81 95 2.08 1.43 42 4.73 0.56 95 −11.69 (315) <0.001** −32.82 (315) <0.001**
Class 2 3.45 1.07 69 4.07 1.38 81 1.82 1.23 36 3.80 1.38 76 −4.64 (119) <0.001** −13.64 (119) <0.001**
Class 3 3.83 0.97 77 4.62 0.78 92 1.82 1.19 36 4.37 0.91 87 −12.25 (220) <0.001** −31.08 (220) <0.001**
Class 4 3.22 1.47 64 3.12 1.70 62 1.66 0.97 33 2.90 1.46 58 0.56 (67) 0.578 −6.99 (67) <0.001**
Overall (N = 725) 3.80 1.07 72 4.44 1.13 83 1.92 1.30 37 4.30 1.10 79
Class 1, Low schizotypy and low paranormal belief (n = 316); Class 2, Moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief (n = 120); Class 3, Moderate schizotypy, high CD and low
paranormal belief (n = 221); and Class 4, Moderate schizotypy and high paranormal belief (n = 68); **Indicates p < 0.006 (Bonferroni adjustment).
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DISCUSSION
General Summary
This study assessed the extent to which latent class membership,
combining schizotypy and belief in the paranormal, influenced
performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks assessing proneness
to statistical bias (perception of randomness and conjunction
error). Analysis identified four latent profiles (low schizotypy and
low belief in the paranormal; moderate schizotypy and moderate
belief in the paranormal; moderate schizotypy, high cognitive
disorganization and low paranormal belief; and moderate
schizotypy and high paranormal belief). These comprised scores
ranging from lower to higher scores on schizotypy and belief
in the paranormal and reflected the most appropriate variable
combinations within the present sample.
Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) Outcomes
The emergence of low, moderate, and to an extent high
schizotypy (i.e., cognitive disorganization; CD) profiles is
consistent with previous within-variable analyses (Loughland
and Williams, 1997; Hori et al., 2014). A counter-intuitive result
concerned class 3 (moderate schizotypy, high CD and low
paranormal belief). Specifically, 29% of the sample appeared to
possess low paranormal belief, but the highest schizotypy levels.
This observation seems to fit with the proposal of Hergovich et al.
(2008), who suggested that although conceptual overlap exists,
schizotypy might not necessarily involve paranormal belief.
Research evidencing a moderate correlation between schizotypy
and paranormal belief supports this proposal (Dagnall et al.,
2010; Darwin et al., 2011). It is likely, therefore, that a subgroup
of individuals exists who are relatively high on schizotypy but do
not particularly endorse paranormal beliefs.
The identification of class 3 demonstrated the value of LPA.
Pure variable-driven research would not have identified this
respondent class. To ensure this cluster represents a reliable
class subsequent research should assess further the extent
to which the group exists within other samples. Robustly
establishing classes across samples will help to confirm cluster
cognitive characteristics and validate between class comparisons.
Sophisticated appreciation of the cognitive profiles of individuals
vis-à-vis those who score high (low) on both traits will produce
a nuanced understanding of anomalous belief. Specifically, the
degree to which variations in schizotypy effect belief acquisition,
organization and processing.
The emergence of a group (class 4) possessing moderate
schizotypy and high paranormal belief (particularly New Age
Philosophy; NAP) concurs with the findings of Houran et al.
(2001). They concluded that NAP involves beliefs relating
to psychopathology or an adverse structure of personality.
Specifically, NAP incorporates beliefs that are partly dissociative
and, therefore, likely to co-occur with schizotypy.
Probabilistic Reasoning Performance as a
Function of LPA Class
Class comparisons revealed that performance on probabilistic
reasoning tasks varied across groups and as a function of
problem type, and these differences remained after controlling for
gender. Regarding standard perception of randomness problems,
class 1 (low schizotypy and low paranormal belief) and class
3 (moderate schizotypy, high CD and low paranormal belief)
performed better than class 2 (moderate schizotypy andmoderate
paranormal belief) and class 4 (moderate schizotypy and high
paranormal belief). There were no significant differences between
classes 1 vs. 3 and 2 vs. 4.
These results indicated that low levels of paranormal belief
were associated with superior performance on perception of
randomness tasks. Level of schizotypy had only a negligible effect
on performance. Moderate levels of schizotypy were concomitant
only with lower levels of task solution when individuals also
possessed high levels of paranormal belief. These results were
consistent with Dagnall et al.’s (2016b) conclusion that belief in
the paranormal wasmore disruptive to perception of randomness
task solution than schizotypy.
Specifically, Dagnall et al. (2016b) found that belief in
the paranormal mediated the association between schizotypy
(Unusual Experiences) and perception of randomness. Within
the present study, there was a clear difference as a function of level
of belief in the paranormal. This finding supported the notion
that belief in the paranormal is associated with misperception of
randomness (Dagnall et al., 2007, 2014, 2016a,b; Dagnall et al.,
2017).
Contrastingly, performance on standard conjunction tasks did
not vary significantly as a function of class. In comparison to
perception of randomness tasks, overall conjunction scores were
lower (72% vs. 37%). Participants were generally less proficient
at solving conjunction tasks. Indeed, results indicated that levels
of belief in the paranormal and schizotypy had only a minor
influence on the ability to solve conjunction fallacy problems.
Overall, findings supported preceding work by Dagnall et al.
(2007, 2014, 2016a,b), which suggested that conjunction (vs.
perception of randomness) tasks are more difficult to solve and
less strongly related to level of belief in the paranormal (Dagnall
et al., 2017).
Regarding framing, when problems were located within
a paranormal context, solution rate increased (perception of
randomness, 83% and conjunction fallacy, 79%). In the case of
paranormal perception of randomness, outcomes paralleled the
pattern of results found for standard perception of randomness
tasks. Explicitly, classes 1 and 3 performed better than classes
2 and 4. The major difference was class 4 (moderate schizotypy
and high paranormal belief group), who scored lower than class
2 (moderate schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief). This
occurred because performance within class 4 failed to increase;
solution rates within other classes improved relative to standard
versions. Participants with higher levels of paranormal belief
found the paranormal perception of randomness problems as
difficult to solve as standard problems. Placing perception of
randomness problems within a paranormal context generally
makes them easier to solve, however, this advantage does
not apply to participants high in belief in the paranormal
(particularly NAP) and schizotypy.
Performance on paranormal conjunction fallacy problems
demonstrated a different pattern of results. Although all
participants performed significantly better on paranormal (vs.
standard) problems, level of improvement varied as a function
of class. Class 1 (low schizotypy and low paranormal belief),
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scored higher than class 3 (moderate schizotypy, high CD and
low paranormal belief), who outperformed class 2 (moderate
schizotypy and moderate paranormal belief), and class 4
(moderate schizotypy and high paranormal belief) scored lowest.
Probabilistic reasoning task solution varied as a function of the
interaction between levels of paranormal belief and schizotypy.
When participants were low on both factors probabilistic
reasoning performance was highest, and when participants
were relatively high on both factors probabilistic reasoning
performance was lowest. Increased levels of schizotypy disrupted
the beneficial effects of context for participants low in paranormal
belief. This finding concurred with the notion that schizotypy
within general populations is only weakly related to propensity to
statistical bias (Dagnall et al., 2017). Generally, as with perception
of randomness, higher levels of belief in the paranormal were
associated with lower levels of improved performance.
It is evident from these results, that participants find
standard perception of randomness tasks easier to solve than
standard conjunctions. It is also clear that performance on
perception of randomness tasks is influenced by levels of
paranormal belief (strongly) and schizotypy (weakly), whereas
propensity to conjunction error is relatively unaffected by
these factors. In the case of both probabilistic reasoning tasks,
there was a clear framing effect, whereby paranormal problem
types (vs. standard) were generally easier to solve. The only
exception was class 4, where performance on paranormal
perception of randomness tasks remained unchanged. Finally,
level of improvement varied as a function of task type and
class membership. Overall, these results provide support for
the previous work of Dagnall et al. (2016b, 2017). The
addition of LPA provided a more nuanced understanding of
how within-individual variation effected probabilistic reasoning
performance; an addition that would not be possible to study via
a variable-centered approach.
The present study indicated that level of paranormal belief
(particularly), and degree of schizotypy influenced proneness to
perception of randomness. These findings support the notion
that illusory causation, particularly limited appreciation of
chance is an important factor associated with belief in the
paranormal. This may be because individuals who are higher
in schizotypy and endorse paranormal beliefs perceive unrelated
events as connected or causally related (Dagnall et al., 2016b).
This notion is consistent with the observation that odd beliefs or
magical thinking influence perceptions of causation (Hergovich
et al., 2008). Belief in the paranormal directly indexes these
factors, whilst schizotypy acts as an indirect measure. This view
is congruent with the view that belief in the paranormal acts as
a worldview or framework in which to interpret odd thinking,
unusual perceptions and experiences. The remaining elements
of schizotypy as defined by the Schizotypal Personality Disorder
diagnostic criteria are less relevant to belief in the paranormal and
perception of causation.
Limitations
A limitation of the present study concerned the relative
distributions of belief in the paranormal and schizotypy.
Precisely, greater variation existed within the paranormal belief
scores in comparison to schizotypy. Whilst schizotypy totals
accorded with norms established by Mason et al. (2005), range
restriction occurred because respondents came from a general,
non-clinical population. Hence, latent profiles only reflected
differences between low and moderate schizotypy. Greater
performance disruption may be evident in samples when higher
levels of schizotypy are present. Considering these factors, the
results indicate that level of paranormal belief effects the ability to
solve perception of randomness problems and suggest that only
high levels of schizotypy influence task solution. To assess this
notion further, subsequent research needs to ensure that samples
possess similar ranges of paranormal belief and schizotypy. More
generally, given sample limitations, the present findings require
cautious interpretation. Additionally, the identified latent profiles
require corroboration in more diverse samples; the present
sample, whilst heterogeneous contained a large percentage of
students. This point is especially important given the data-driven,
exploratory nature of LPA. Furthermore, consensus regarding the
identification of the current classes or others should remain an
active field of inquiry.
Performance of LPA requires caution because recoding
continuous data to produce meaningful categorical variables
can result in substantial information loss (Lanza and Rhoades,
2013). In the present study, emergent classes were conceptually
meaningful and statistically distinguishable, however, it is
important to guard against reification. Categories identified via
LPA represent merely heterogeneity across dimensions included
in the model not types of individuals present within the
population (Lanza and Rhoades, 2013). Misspecification can
occur if LPA identifies too many or too few classes. To reduce
the possibility of misspecification future studies could employ
cross-validation methods, such as double cross-validation (see
Collins et al., 1994) or progressive elaboration (see Donovan
and Chung, 2015). These methods provide useful objective tests
of model fit and help to establish class stability. Although,
it is important to note that cross-validation indicates only
the best approximation to the true model (Collins et al.,
1994).
Finally, related research indicates that susceptibility to
statistical bias varies as a function of cognitive-perceptual factor
(e.g., schizotypy, delusional ideation, hallucination proneness;
Dagnall et al., 2015) and belief type (e.g., paranormal belief
and conspiratorial ideation; Dagnall et al., 2017). Illustratively,
propensity to conjunction error correlates more strongly with
conspiratorial ideation than belief in the paranormal (Dagnall
et al., 2017). In this context, future studies using latent profiles
could provide amore sophisticated understanding of interactions
between cognitive-perceptual factors, beliefs and propensity to
heuristic bias.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
AD and ND: theoretical focus, data analysis and article
development; KD: collected data and contributed to the writing
process; AP: contributed to the writing process.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 January 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 35
Denovan et al. Schizotypy and Paranormal Belief
REFERENCES
Akaike, H. (1987). Factor analysis and AIC. Psychometrika 52, 317–332.
doi: 10.1007/BF02294359
Andrich, D. (1988). Rasch Models for Measurement, Vol. 68. London: Sage.
Arnott, D. (1998). A Taxonomy of Decision Biases. Melbourne, VIC: Monash
University.
Arnott, D. (2006). Cognitive biases and decision support systems
development: a design science approach. Inform. Syst. J. 16, 55–78.
doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2575.2006.00208.x
Barrantes-Vidal, N., Grant, P., and Kwapil, T. R. (2015). The role of schizotypy in
the study of the etiology of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Schizophr. Bull.
41 (Suppl. 2), S408–S416. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbu191
Bentall, R. P., Claridge, G. S., and Slade, P. D. (1989). The multidimensional nature
of schizotypal traits: a factor analytic study with normal subjects. Br. J. Clin.
Psycholo. 28, 363–375. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8260.1989.tb00840.x
Blackmore, S., andMoore, R. (1994). Seeing things: visual recognition and belief in
the paranormal. Eur. J. Parapsychol. 10, 91–103.
Blackmore, S., and Tros´cianko, T. (1985). Belief in the paranormal: probability
judgements, illusory control, and the ‘chance baseline shift’. Br. J. Psychol. 76,
459–468.
Bressan, P. (2002). The connection between random sequences, everyday
coincidences, and belief in the paranormal. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 16, 17–34.
doi: 10.1002/acp.754
Brugger, P. (1997). Variables that influence the generation of random sequences:
an update. Percept. Mot. Skills 84, 627–661. doi: 10.2466/pms.1997.84.2.627
Burch, G. S. J., Steel, C., and Hemsley, D. R. (1998). Oxford—Liverpool inventory
of feelings and experiences: reliability in an experimental population. Br. J. Clin.
Psychol. 37, 107–108. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8260.1998.tb01284.x
Cardeña, E., Palmer, J., and Marcusson-Clavertz, D. (eds.). (2015). Parapsychology:
A Handbook for the 21st Century. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Cicero, D. C., and Kerns, J. G. (2010). Multidimensional factor structure of positive
schizotypy. J. Pers. Disord. 24, 327–343. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2010.24.3.327
Claridge, G. (1997). Schizotypy. Implications for Illness and Health. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Claridge, G.S., and Beech, A. (1995). “Fully and quasi-dimensional constructions
of schizotypy,” in Schizotypal Personality, eds A. Raine and T. Lencz (New York,
NY: Cambridge), 192–216.
Collins, L. M., Graham, J. W., Long, J. D., and Hansen, W. B. (1994).
Crossvalidation of latent class models of early substance use onset. Multiv.
Behav. Res. 29, 165–183. doi: 10.1207/s15327906mbr2902_3
Compton, M. T., Goulding, S. M., Bakeman, R., and McClure-Tone, E. B.
(2009). Confirmation of a four-factor structure of the Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire among undergraduate students. Schizophr. Res. 111, 46–52.
doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2009.02.012
Costello, F., andMathison, T. (2014). “On fallacies and normative reasoning: when
people’s judgements follow probability theory”, in Proceedings of the Cognitive
Science Society (Quebec City), 361–366.
Dag, I. (1999). The relationships among paranormal beliefs, locus of control and
psychopathology in a Turkish college sample. Pers. Individ. Dif. 26, 723–737.
doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00184-6
Dagnall, N., Denovan, A., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., and Clough, P. (2016b).
Toward a better understanding of the relationship between belief in the
paranormal and statistical bias: the potential role of schizotypy. Front. Psychol.
7:1045. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01045
Dagnall, N., Denovan, A., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., and Clough, P. J. (2017).
Urban legends and paranormal beliefs: the role of reality testing and schizotypy.
Front. Psychol. 8:942. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00942
Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Denovan, A., Parker, A., and Rowley, K.
(2016a). Misperception of chance, conjunction, framing effects and belief
in the paranormal: a further evaluation. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 30, 409–419.
doi: 10.1002/acp.3217
Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., Denovan, A., and Parton, M. (2015).
Conspiracy theory and cognitive style: a worldview. Front. Psychol. 6:206.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00206
Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., and Rowley, K. (2014). Misperception of
chance, conjunction, belief in the paranormal and reality testing: a reappraisal.
Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 28, 711–719. doi: 10.1002/acp.3057
Dagnall, N., Munley, G., Parker, A., and Drinkwater, K. (2010). Paranormal belief,
schizotypy, and transliminality. J. Parapsychol. 74, 117–141.
Dagnall, N., Parker, A., and Munley, G. (2007). Paranormal belief and reasoning.
Pers. Individ. Dif. 43, 1406–1415. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2007.04.017
Darwin, H., Neave, N., and Holmes, J. (2011). Belief in conspiracy theories. The
role of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. Pers. Indiv. Diff.
50, 1289–1293. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2011.02.027
Deleuze, J., Rochat, L., Romo, L., Van der Linden, M., Achab, S., Thorens,
G., et al. (2015). Prevalence and characteristics of addictive behaviors in
a community sample: a latent class analysis. Addict. Behav. Rep. 1, 49–56.
doi: 10.1016/j.abrep.2015.04.001
Dembinska-Krajewska, D., and Rybakowski, J. (2014). The Oxford-Liverpool
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) schizotypy scale in psychiatry.
Arch. Psychiatr. Psychother. 2, 15–22. doi: 10.12740/APP/26780
Donovan, J. E., and Chung, T. (2015). Progressive elaboration and cross-validation
of a latent class typology of adolescent alcohol involvement in a national
sample. J. Stud. Alcohol Drugs 76, 419–429. doi: 10.15288/jsad.2015.76.419
Eckblad, M., and Chapman, L. J. (1983). Magical ideation as an
indicator of schizotypy. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 51, 215–225.
doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.51.2.215
Gigerenzer, G., and Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 62, 451–482. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
Goode, E. (2000). Paranormal Beliefs: A sociological Introduction. Prospect Heights,
IL: Waveland Press.
Goulding, A., and Parker, A. (2001). Finding psi in the paranormal: psychometric
measures used in research on paranormal beliefs/experiences and in research
on psi-ability. Eur. J. Parapsychol. 16, 73–101.
Hergovich, A., Schott, R., and Arendasy, M. (2008). On the relationship between
paranormal belief and schizotypy among adolescents. Pers. Individ. Dif. 45,
119–125. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2008.03.005
Hori, H., Teraishi, T., Sasayama, D., Matsuo, J., Kinoshita, Y., Ota, M., et al.
(2014). A latent profile analysis of schizotypy, temperament and character in
a nonclinical population: association with neurocognition. J. Psychiatr. Res. 48,
56–64. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2013.10.006
Houran, J., Irwin, H. J., and Lange, R. (2001). Clinical relevance of the two-factor
rasch version of the revised paranormal belief scale. Pers. Individ. Dif. 31,
371–382. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00143-4
Hussain, Z., Williams, G. A., and Griffiths, M. D. (2015). An exploratory study of
the association between online gaming addiction and enjoyment motivations
for playing massively multiplayer online role-playing games. Comput. Human
Behav. 50, 221–230. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2015.03.075
Irwin, H. J. (1993). Belief in the paranormal: a review of the empirical literature. J.
Am. Soc. Psychic. Res. 87, 1–39.
Irwin, H. J., Dagnall, N., and Drinkwater, K. (2013). Parapsychological
experience as anomalous experience plus paranormal attribution: a
questionnaire based on a new approach to measurement. J. Parapsychol.
77, 39–53.
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychol.
Rev., 80, 237–251. doi: 10.1037/h0034747
Kwapil, T. R., Brown, L. H., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., and Barrantes-
Vidal, N. (2012). The expression of positive and negative schizotypy in
daily life: an experience sampling study. Psychol. Med. 42, 2555–2566.
doi: 10.1017/S0033291712000827
Lange, R., Irwin, H. J., and Houran, J. (2000). Top-down purification of
Tobacyk’s revised paranormal belief scale. Pers. Individ. Dif. 29, 131–156.
doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00183-X
Lanza, S. T., and Rhoades, B. L. (2013). Latent class analysis: an alternative
perspective on subgroup analysis in prevention and treatment. Prevent. Sci. 14,
157–168. doi: 10.1007/s11121-011-0201-1
Lenzenweger, M. F. (2015). Thinking clearly about schizotypy: hewing to
the schizophrenia liability core, considering interesting tangents, and
avoiding conceptual quicksand. Schizophr. Bull. 41(Suppl. 2), S483–S491.
doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbu184
Lo, Y., Mendell, N. R., and Rubin, D. B. (2001). Testing the number of components
in a normal mixture. Biometrika 88, 767–778. doi: 10.1093/biomet/88.3.767
Loughland, C. M., and Williams, J. M. (1997). A cluster analytic study
of schizotypal trait dimensions. Pers. Individ. Dif. 23, 877–883.
doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(97)00086-X
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 January 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 35
Denovan et al. Schizotypy and Paranormal Belief
Mason, O., and Claridge, G. (2006). The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings
and Experiences (O-LIFE): further description and extended norms. Schizophr.
Res. 82, 203–211. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2005.12.845
Mason, O., Claridge, G., and Jackson, M. (1995). New scales for the assessment of
schizotypy. Pers. Individ. Dif. 18, 7–13. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(94)00132-C
Mason, O., Linney, Y., and Claridge, G. (2005). Short scales for measuring
schizotypy. Schizophr. Res. 78, 293–296. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2005.
06.020
Muthén, L. K., andMuthén, B. O. (2012).Mplus User’s Guide, 7th Edn. Los Angeles,
CA: Muthén and Muthén.
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric Theory, 2nd Edn. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill.
Orri, M., Pingault, J. B., Rouquette, A., Lalanne, C., Falissard, B., Herba,
C., et al. (2017). Identifying affective personality profiles: a latent profile
analysis of the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales. Sci. Rep. 7, 45–48.
doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-04738-x
Prike, T., Arnold,M.M., andWilliamson, P. (2017). Psychics, aliens, or experience?
Using the Anomalistic Belief Scale to examine the relationship between
type of belief and probabilistic reasoning. Conscious. Cogn. 53, 151–164.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.06.003
Ramaswamy, V., DeSarbo, W. S., Reibstein, D. J., and Robinson, W. T. (1993). An
empirical pooling approach for estimatingmarketingmix elasticities with PIMS
data.Market. Sci. 12, 103–124. doi: 10.1287/mksc.12.1.103
Rogers, P. (2014). “Paranormal believers’ proneness to probabilistic reasoning
biases,” inAberrant Beliefs and Reasoning, ed N. D. Galbraith (Hove: Psychology
Press), 114–131.
Rogers, P., Davis, T., and Fisk, J. E. (2009). Paranormal belief and susceptibility to
the conjunction fallacy.Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 23, 524–542. doi: 10.1002/acp.1472
Rogers, P., Fisk, J. E., and Lowrie, E. (2016). Paranormal believers’ susceptibility
to confirmatory versus disconfirmatory conjunctions. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 30,
628–634. doi: 10.1002/acp.3222
Rogers, P., Fisk, J. E., and Wiltshire, D. (2011). Paranormal belief and
the conjunction fallacy: controlling for temporal relatedness and potential
surprise differentials in component events. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 25, 692–702.
doi: 10.1002/acp.1732
Schwarz, G. (1978). Estimating the dimension of a model. Ann. Stat. 6, 461–464.
doi: 10.1214/aos/1176344136
Sclove, S. L. (1987). Application of model-selection criteria to some problems in
multivariate analysis. Psychometrika 52, 333–343. doi: 10.1007/BF02294360
Shah, A. K., and Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). Heuristics made
easy: an effort-reduction framework. Psychol. Bull. 134, 207–222.
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.207
Tabachnick, B. G., and Fidell, L. S. (2001). Using Multivariate Statistics, 4th Edn.
Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Thalbourne, M. A., and French, C. C. (1995). Paranormal belief, manic-
depressiveness, and magical ideation: a replication. Pers. Individ. Dif. 18,
291–292. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(94)00146-J
Tobacyk, J. J. (2004). A revised paranormal belief scale. Int. J. Transp. Stud. 23,
94–99.
Tobacyk, J. J., andMilford, G. (1983). Belief in paranormal phenomena: assessment
instrument development and implications for personality functioning. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 44, 1029–1037. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.44.5.1029
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases. Science 185, 1124–1130. doi: 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1982). “Evidential impact of base rates,” in
Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, eds D. Kahneman, P.
Slovic, and A. Tversky (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 153–160.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning:
the conjunction fallacy in probability judgement. Psychol. Rev. 90, 293–315.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1993). “Probabilistic reasoning,” in Readings in
Philosophy and Cognitive Science, ed A. I. Goldman (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press), 43–68.
Williams, L. M., and Irwin, H. J. (1991). A study of paranormal belief, magical
ideation as an index of schizotypy and cognitive style. Pers. Individ. Dif. 12,
1339–1348. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(91)90210-3
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Denovan, Dagnall, Drinkwater and Parker. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 January 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 35
